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Previously, hosted apps were exempt from LockToOrigin() even in
--site-per-process mode.  That meant that hosted apps were not subject
to enforcements such as not allowing access to cookies, passwords, or
local storage of other sites.  Worse, it meant that hosted apps could
arbitrarily share a process (e.g., when over process limit), even if
they covered different web sites with --site-per-process.

This CL starts locking hosted apps to their underlying web origin.  If
a frame commits a navigation to URL http://foo.com, which is part of a
hosted app X's web extent, the process for that frame will be locked
to http://foo.com.  Note that the SiteInstance for this frame will
still use a site URL based on the effective URL (i.e.,
chrome-extension://<ext_id_for_X>/), but the origin lock will not be
based on effective URLs.  This requires plumbing to compute the origin
lock as a site URL that does not use an effective URL, and to plumb it
into various places that make process model decisions, such as
RPHI::IsSuitableHost().

Bug: 811939, 794315, 791796
Change-Id: Icc9b3c0a04253e581ea35953f3c566308305db59
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/959346
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583895}