Commit 261c0ae2 authored by rsleevi@chromium.org's avatar rsleevi@chromium.org

Revert 107679 - Broke https for appspot.com - http://crbug.com/102507

Disallow wildcards from matching top-level registry controlled domains during cert validation.

BUG=100442
TEST=net_unittests:X509CertificateNameVerifyTest.*


Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=107075

Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8362023

TBR=rsleevi@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8438024

git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@108216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
parent 13a8aa1a
......@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/net_util.h"
#include "net/base/pem_tokenizer.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domain.h"
namespace net {
......@@ -509,36 +508,17 @@ bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname(
// |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host
// component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g.
// "www.f.com" -> ".f.com".
// If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no
// dots) then |reference_domain| will be empty.
// If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots)
// then |reference_domain| will be empty.
base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain;
SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain);
bool allow_wildcards = false;
if (!reference_domain.empty()) {
DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with("."));
// Do not allow wildcards for registry controlled domains, so as to
// prevent accepting *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names. Passing
// true for |allow_unknown_registries| so that top-level domains which are
// unknown (intranet domains, new TLDs/gTLDs not yet recognized) are
// treated as registry-controlled domains. Because the |reference_domain|
// must contain at least one name component that is not registry
// controlled, this ensures that all reference names have at least three
// domain components in order to permit wildcards.
size_t registry_length =
RegistryControlledDomainService::GetRegistryLength(reference_name,
true);
// As the |reference_name| was already canonicalized, this should never
// happen.
CHECK_NE(registry_length, std::string::npos);
// Subtracting 1 to account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|.
bool is_registry_controlled = registry_length != 0 &&
registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1);
// Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric
// hostnames.
allow_wildcards = !is_registry_controlled &&
// We required at least 3 components (i.e. 2 dots) as a basic protection
// against too-broad wild-carding.
// Also we don't attempt wildcard matching on a purely numerical hostname.
allow_wildcards = reference_domain.rfind('.') != 0 &&
reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos;
}
......
......@@ -1345,6 +1345,7 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
"xn--poema-*.com.br,"
"xn--*-9qae5a.com.br,"
"*--poema-9qae5a.com.br" },
{ true, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" },
// The following are adapted from the examples quoted from
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
// (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
......@@ -1358,21 +1359,12 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
{ true, "baz1.example.net", "baz*.example.net" },
{ true, "foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net" },
{ true, "buzz.example.net", "b*z.example.net" },
// Wildcards should not be valid for registry-controlled domains, and for
// unknown/unrecognized domains, at least three domain components must be
// present.
{ true, "www.test.example", "*.test.example" },
{ true, "test.example.co.uk", "*.example.co.uk" },
{ false, "test.example", "*.example" },
{ false, "example.co.uk", "*.co.uk" },
// Wildcards should not be valid unless there are at least three name
// components.
{ true, "h.co.uk", "*.co.uk" },
{ false, "foo.com", "*.com" },
{ false, "foo.us", "*.us" },
{ false, "foo", "*" },
// IDN variants of wildcards and registry-controlled domains.
{ true, "www.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br" },
{ true, "test.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.example.xn--mgbaam7a8h" },
{ false, "xn--poema-9qae5a.com.br", "*.com.br" },
{ false, "example.xn--mgbaam7a8h", "*.xn--mgbaam7a8h" },
// Multiple wildcards are not valid.
{ false, "foo.example.com", "*.*.com" },
{ false, "foo.bar.example.com", "*.bar.*.com" },
......@@ -1393,9 +1385,6 @@ const CertificateNameVerifyTestData kNameVerifyTestData[] = {
{ false, "example.com.", "*.com" },
{ false, "example.com.", "*.com." },
{ false, "foo.", "*." },
{ false, "foo", "*." },
{ false, "foo.co.uk", "*.co.uk." },
{ false, "foo.co.uk.", "*.co.uk." },
// IP addresses in common name; IPv4 only.
{ true, "127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1" },
{ true, "192.168.1.1", "192.168.1.1" },
......
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