[Security] Enforce COOP on redirects.

COOP was parsed for redirects already, but not properly enforced.
This patch makes sure any redirect combination that would have led to a
switch does put the final URL in a separate BrowsingInstance.

Change-Id: Ia289cf661add09a8e86392c7c650219b90ac0a1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2132220Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Arthur Hemery <ahemery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#755944}

content/browser/frame_host/render_frame_host_manager.cc

@@ -2446,7 +2446,8 @@ RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
       request->common_params().transition,
       request->state() >= NavigationRequest::CANCELING, is_reload,
       request->GetRestoreType() != RestoreType::NONE, request->is_view_source(),
-      request->WasServerRedirect(), cross_origin_policy_swap);
+      request->WasServerRedirect(),
+      request->require_coop_browsing_instance_swap());
 
   // If the NavigationRequest's dest_site_instance was present but incorrect,
   // then ensure no sensitive state is kept on the request. This can happen for

third_party/blink/web_tests/external/wpt/html/cross-origin-opener-policy/coep-redirect.https-expected.txt

-This is a testharness.js-based test.
-PASS Redirect from coop/coep to coop/coep
-PASS Redirect from coop/coep to no coop/coep
-FAIL Redirect from no coop/no coep to coop/coep assert_equals: name expected "" but got "Redirect-from-no-coop/no-coep-to-coop/coep"
-FAIL Redirect from coop/no coep to coop/coep assert_equals: name expected "" but got "Redirect-from-coop/no-coep-to-coop/coep"
-FAIL Redirect from coop unsafe-none/coep to coop/coep assert_equals: name expected "" but got "Redirect-from-coop-unsafe-none/coep-to-coop/coep"
-PASS Redirect from coop unsafe-none/coep to coop unsafe-inherit/coep
-Harness: the test ran to completion.
-