Allow extension process reuse in --site-per-process;
make SiteIsolationPolicy public. The problem was that --site-per-process disabled extension process sharing, but the site-per-process base::Feature (which we've been field trialing) did not. This was due to the extensions code checking only for the flag, and not considering the field trial state as well. components/printing actually got the logic right, but only by reproducing a lot of business logic. Thus, it seems appropriate to move SiteIsolationPolicy to content/public, so that we can centralize the "what kind of oopifs are there" logic. For printing, this change adds a new getter function specific to oopif compositor, since that's basically a derived policy of the process model. For extensions, we've decided to disable LockToOrigin in --site-per-process (rather than to enable it in the feature), since origin-locking extensions doesn't help with the spectre threat, and --site-per-process is about spectre these days. [Charlie suggests we develop some kind of "extension isolation v2" proposal, maybe reviving the --isolate-extension flag for that purpose!] Bug: 824966, 766267 Change-Id: Ibf7592c9d522fd0c99057358bcc34b5881780db8 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/949966 Commit-Queue: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Wei Li <weili@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548645}
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