Commit fcceae4b authored by Adrian Taylor's avatar Adrian Taylor Committed by Commit Bot

Security-labels documentation.

Clarifying documentation to make it clear that a disabled feature
does not necessarily result in Security_Impact-None.

Also, bringing note on Sheriffbot behavior up to date.

R=cthomp@chromium.org, nasko@chromium.org

Change-Id: I6073b579dc490e8dd67e0faf240ad8232cb58af4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1829743
Commit-Queue: Adrian Taylor <adetaylor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarNasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarChristopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#701288}
parent 9328a814
......@@ -32,9 +32,25 @@ that.)
* **Security_Impact-**{**Head**, **Beta**, **Stable**, **None**}: Designates
which branch(es) were impacted by the bug. Only apply the label corresponding
with the earliest affected branch. **None** means that a security bug is in a
disabled feature, or otherwise doesn't impact Chrome. Note that
**Security_Severity** should still be set on **Security_Impact-None** issues, as
if the feature were enabled or the code reachable.
disabled feature, or otherwise doesn't impact Chrome. A disabled feature does
not _guarantee_ impact **None**:
* The feature really must be disabled on 100% of devices. Specifically,
if the feature is controlled by field trials or some other network
configuration service, the feature must also be disabled by default in
the code, such that the code is inactive even on devices that can't
access the network configuration service.
* The feature control check must be somewhere that the attacker could not
have influenced. For example a privilege escalation from a lower-
privileged process to a higher-privileged process assumes that the lower-
privileged process is already compromised. The attacker could overwrite
memory for any feature checks performed within that lower-privileged
process; the bug only qualifies as impact **None** if checks are
performed in the higher-privileged process. (For example, in a
privilege escalation from the renderer to the browser process, the
checks would need to be in the browser process.)
* Note that **Security_Severity** should still be set on
**Security_Impact-None** issues, as if the feature were enabled or the
code reachable.
* **Restrict-View-**{**SecurityTeam**, **SecurityNotify**, **Google**,
**SecurityEmbargo**}: Labels that restrict access to the bug. Meaning and usage
guidelines are as follows:
......@@ -86,7 +102,7 @@ This is more fine-grained than the **M-#** label. **Release-0-M50** denotes the
initial release of a M50 to Stable.
* **CVE-####-####**: For security bugs that get assigned a CVE, we tag the
appropriate bug(s) with the label for easy searching.
**Type-Bug-Security** bugs should always have **Security_Severity**,
**Type-Bug-Security** bugs should always have **Security_Severity**,
**Security_Impact**, **OS**, **Pri**, **M**, **Component**, and an
**owner** set.
......@@ -178,10 +194,11 @@ fixed security bugs. Rationale is that while fixed bugs are generally not
intended to become public immediately, we'd like to give access to external
parties depending on Chromium via *security-notify@chromium.org*.
### Set **Merge-Request-X** For Beta Branch For Fixed Bugs
### Set **Merge-Request-X** For Fixed Bugs
Fixed security bugs that affect stable or beta and are critical or high severity
will automatically trigger a merge request for the current beta branch.
will automatically trigger a merge request for the current beta branch, and
perhaps stable if also impacted.
### Drop **ReleaseBlock-X** Labels From **Security_Impact-None** Bugs
......
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